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The  pricing  of financial  assets,  this  paper  contends,  it  does  not  consist  only  in 
assessing a technical value from a valuation model and then calibrating such value 
by looking at the market. In order to sharpen up this complex process we are going 
to handle, firstly, a valuation procedure that stems from the temporal structure of 
rates of return adjusted for risk. Secondly, the concept of the physical world of 
finance is introduced just to move further onto the cost-profit structure of dealers 
and big players, highlighting the far-reaching role of transaction costs. Next, we 
work  out  both  ask  and  bid  references  prices  by  linking  technical  values  with 
spreads. Afterwards, prices in actual trading are contrasted with reference prices, 
hence bringing out the quasi-rents rates to which dealers earnestly seek for at the 
end  of  the  day.  Lastly,  reference  prices,  spreads,  and  quasi-rent  rates  are 
compounded together quantitatively, so as to enhance the understanding and the 
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and the University of Cema disclaims any responsibility for them.   3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two realms for the pricing of financial assets: the one where models are 
worked out, and the one we are going to denote the ²physical world of Finance². 
The healthier approach, extensively employed in good practice, consists in taking 
certain  valuation  model  down-to-earth  and  ascertain  whether  it  is  a  good 
companion to guide us in shaping up our decision-making or not. In the latter case, 
we send the model back to the original realm of modeling, whereas in the former 
instance, we would say ²it is a model with pragmatic consequences, albeit all the 
changes  that  must  undergo  in  the  painstakingly  landing  to  planet  Earth².  As 
Emanuel Derman (2009) compellingly put it: 
 
The greatest danger in financial modeling is the age-old sin of idolatry. Financial markets are alive, 
but a model is a limited, human work of art. Although a model may be entrancing, we will not be 
able to breathe life into it, no matter how hard we try. To confuse the model with the world is to 
embrace a future disaster driven by the belief that humans obey mathematical rules.  
 
In the ordinary run of things, a variegated set of financial intermediaries committed 
to valuation and trading, mainly dealers, market makers and bargain hunters
1 avail 
themselves of a valuation model so as to accomplish the task of setting prices to 
financial assets. But this is only the starting point of the process of pricing, although 
some people still seem to regard that it could also signal the final point as soon as 
the dynamics of markets magically moves on automatic pilot. 
 
This paper premises the idea that price-setters in the physical  world of finance 
must cope with four levels of active decision-making: 
 
a)  Getting a technical value that comes out of a valuation model. 
b)  Working out a cost-benefit structure to be linked with the technical value. 
c)  Taking advantage of market patterns of behavior at the time of the pricing. 
                                                 
1 A well-known typology that was introduced by Jack Treynor (1967, 1999), about which further 
development will take place in section 5.   4 
d)  Realizing  that  pricing  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  quest  for  quasi-rents  in 
contexts of asymmetric information. 
 
In section 1, we expand on how to appraise the technical value of a financial asset 
profiting from the temporal structure of returns adjusted for risk. Section 2 brings 
forth the concept of “the physical world of finance”. Next, in section 3, we delve into 
the  cost-profit  structure  faced  by  dealers  in  their  regular  trading.  Afterwards, 
section 4 addresses the subject matter of references prices and spreads. Section 5 
sets out the pricing process as a quest for quasi-rents. Conclusions will follow.  
 
1. ON THE TECHNICAL VALUE 
 
As from the 60s in last century, academics and practitioners got used to carrying 
out valuation by means of a wide range of available tools. They could resort to the 
CAPM
2,  the  APT
3,  Black-Scholes,  Binomial  Paths,  stochastic  equations,  just  to 
notice  some  outstanding  methods  of  valuation.  Almost  all  of  these  customary 
techniques have been applied so far against the background of the versatile model 
of discounted cash flows expected from the financial asset under analysis. 
 
Early in the 80s, however, there was a financial innovation that allowed for a more 
down-to-earth valuation procedure. Some big players in the market, like Merryll 
Lynch  and  Salomon  Brothers,  started  to  offer  and  sell  securities  backed  by 
Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds that had been pooled together in a trust fund. In 
the final analysis, investors were able to buy proxies of zero-coupon bonds, either 
to collect interest coupons or principals, in both cases at maturity dates. Shortly 
afterwards, albeit some queries and reservations raised by the Federal Reserve, 
                                                 
2 Following Sharpe (1964) and Brennan (1999), by CAPM we mean here at least both the CML 
(capital  market  line)  which  is  the  place  where  efficient  separation-portfolios  lie,  and  the  SML 
(securities market line) which is the place where expected returns of any financial asset or portfolios 
can be assessed so as to become instrumental in furnishing a technical value related to pricing. 
3 On this path-breaking contribution, see Ross (1976).   5 
Treasury Strips
4 began to be issued and transacted, giving rise to a thriving market 
of zero-coupon bonds
5.   
 
Among the many distinctive consequences of this new financial development, two 
of them were truly remarkable
6: 
 
·  As from that time on, practitioners could have zero-coupon bonds whose 
maturities spanned from few days through thirty years (the longest maturity 
of  the  most  recently  issued  T-Bond).  In  other  words,  practitioners  and 
analysts were able to plot those bonds according to maturity and yield to 
maturity, a scatter diagram out of which the temporal structure of rates of 
returns was born. 
 
·  Once  the  temporal  structure  had  been  set  up,  an  adjustment  curve  was 
determined  to  approximate  and  give  account  of  the  set  of  points  in  the 
temporal structure. This marked the starting date for the well-known yield 
curve. 
 
Zero-coupon bonds, the temporal structure of rates of return, and the yield curve 
entailed an improvement in the valuation methods available up to that moment. 
Cash flows were to be discounted henceforth by a financial combo comprising a 
Treasury  Strip  rate,  plus  country  risk,  plus  credit  risk  of  the  company  whose 
security has to be valued. Hence, the technical value grows out of actual rates 
available in the market, and the analyst need not to resort to any of the so-called 
                                                 
4 That is to say, a coupon-bearing T-Bond or T-Note is stripped from their coupons of interest and 
principal, so that each of them can be traded separately and on their own. 
5 See, for instance, a practitioner’s viewpoint about the market for U.S. Treasuries Strips in Gregory 
and Livingston (1992), while a broader analysis is addressed in Apreda (2010). 
6 Among other pragmatic consequences, we can point out to those linked to valuation of investment 
projects and the shaping of discounting rates adjusted for governance risks, as they have lately 
been engineered by Apreda (2010, 2009).    6 
equilibrium  models  whose  performance  in  the  physical  world  of  finance  have 
become, to say the least, increasingly debatable
7.  
 
This paper will benefit from such financial innovation by which the technical value 
stems from the following algorithm: 
(1) 
 
CF( j ) 
V( t )   =     
        days (t ; j) / 180 




a)  CF(j) in (1) will stand for the cash flow we expect to collect at the end of 
period (j–1;j). Throughout this paper, the period will be assimilated into a 
semester. 
 
b)  s adj ( t ; j ) denotes the yearly nominal spot rate of return, adjusted for risk 
that will accrue from date t through date j, compounding along semesters. 
An increasingly used format is the following: 
 
s adj ( t; j )  =  s US STRIP (t; j)  +  D D D D country-risk rate (t; j)  + D D D D credit-risk rate (t;j) 
 
The  spot  rate  adjusted  for  risk,  hence,  consists  of  a  risk-free  rate  plus  two 
adjustments that account, firstly, for a systematic-risk correction (country risk) and, 
secondly, a non-systematic-risk correction (credit risk
8). It is worth noticing that far 
from being a constant rate, the spot rate becomes temporalized in this down-to-
earth approach available from the 80s. 
 
                                                 
7 On this point, the reader is referred to Shleifer (1999), Shleifer and Summers (1990), the witty 
approach  to  the  dark  side  of  valuation  rendered  by  Damodaran  (2009)  and  critical  front-page 
articles from The Economist (July 18, 2009) in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis. 
S S S S   7 
c)  days(t; j) counts the number of days in the whole span of the horizon that 
starts at date t and finishes at date j. 
 
d)  relationship  (1)  assumes  that  the  compounding  period  be  a  semester. 
Otherwise, minor changes should furnish the general expression:  
 
 
CF( j ) 
V( t )   =     
        days (t; j) / days in period 
[ 1 +  s adj (t; j) / periods in the year ] 
 
 
e)  this viewpoint about valuation is not the only one that holds in the industry; 
in  point  of  fact,  there  are  alternative  valuation  techniques  ready  to  use.  
More  background  on  other  methods  of  valuation  can  be  found  in 
Damodaran (2006). At this juncture, we should keep in mind what Frank 
Knight  (1965,  p.  63)  warned  us  in  his  landmark  book  on  risk,  profit  and 
uncertainty: 
 
The fact of relativity is important, because easily and commonly lost sight of. Every valuation is a 
comparison; we have no conception of an absolute utility or an absolute standard of utility. The 
notion of value is meaningless except in relation to alternatives of choice. 
 
 
2. THE PHYSICAL WORLD OF FINANCE 
 
In the real world, things do not take place exactly as they are predicated upon by 
models,  a  not  surprising  feature  since  the  latter  have  to  make  simplifying 
assumptions,  even  farfetched  ones.  That  is  why  we  contend  that  the  following 
definition lays foundation to contexts of applications in Finance, making allowances 
for the facts and constraints of trading, markets, intermediaries, and regulations. 
                                                                                                                                                     
8 Net of country risk, to avoid double-keeping. 
S S S S   8 
 Definition 1  
The physical world of finance consists of the following components: 
 
·  Financial  markets  and  the  variegated  assortment  of  economic  agents 
involved  in  the  running  of  them,  including  single  investors
9,  banks, 
institutional investors, intermediaries in the broadest sense so as to include 
dealers, market makers, brokers and retail intermediaries. 
  
·  Governance structures, that is to say, the institutional matrices within which 
transactions  are  negotiated  and  executed,  which  include  regulators  and 
gatekeepers to overlook whether the rules of the game are duly enforced. 
 
·  Transaction  costs
10  in  the  widest  meaning,  encompassing  trading  costs, 




a)  Definitions,  within  the  scope  of  this  paper,  stand  for  a  semantic  and 
methodological vehicle on behalf of any considered reader who may ask 
himself: which is the meaning to be attached to such and such expression? 
Under no circumstances definitions will intend to be the best ones, still less 
the only ones to be adopted.  Their only purpose is to constrain the meaning 
of the expression at hand for the sake of precision. 
 
b) As a counterpart to this definition, and in the realm of models, I have set 
forth elsewhere the concept of transactional algebras (Apreda, 2006). 
 
                                                 
9 We include here family units or small- and medium-sized companies, even corporations or state-
owned companies, and the like. 
10 In next section, transaction costs will be treated at length.   9 
In concluding this section, it must be noticed that most models still in use make 
unwarranted  assumptions  on  transaction  costs  (regarded  as  non  existent), 
intermediaries  (they  do  not  exist)  and  institutional  arrangements  (they  do  not 
account).  Reversing  this  trend,  last  decades  have  witnessed  an  outpouring  of 
realistic  models  and  pragmatic  viewpoints  through  worthy  contributions
11  in  the 
fields of market microstructure (Spulber, 1996, 1999); risk, uncertainty and profit 
(Knight, 1921, 1965); transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979); corporate 
governance  (Williamson,  1988);  institutional  economics  (North,  1991);  law  and 
finance  (Roe,  2003);  asymmetric  markets  (Scitovsky,  1990);  differential  rates, 
residual information sets, and transactional algebras (Apreda, 2006); as well as the 
role intermediaries come to play in real exchanges (Demsetz, 1968).  
 
 
3. THE COST-PROFIT STRUCTURE 
 
A down-to-earth pricing process must cope with the cost-benefit structure on the 
side of dealers and other significant intermediaries; otherwise there would not be 
intermediaries of any sort. It was Oliver Williamson (1979, p. 233) who forcefully 
stressed this subject: 
 
The  new  institutional  economics  is  preoccupied  with  the  origin,  incidence,  and  ramification  of 
transaction costs. Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activities 
is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will 
singly be eliminated by costless contracting. But despite the growing realization that transaction 
costs are central to the study of economics, skeptics remain. 
 
A minimal framework for such cost-profit structure has to single out three main 
components: 
 
·  fixed and variable costs (fvcosts);  
                                                 
11 We are referring only to a few outstanding contributions as from which further background and 
sources might be directly attained.   10
·  transaction costs (transcosts); 
·  survival profit (profit).  
 
The cost-benefit structure brings about a wedge or spread between the technical 
value, on the one side, and the selling or buying prices, on the other. Here, we 
have to handle two distinctive spreads, according to which leg of the transaction a 
distinctive dealer is running on his business. 
 
In order to get the asked spread we must take into account fixed and variable 
costs, transaction costs, and the survival profit on behalf of the dealer, framed as 
rates of change. That is to say, for certain dealer d k, and at date t
12: 
(2) 
[ 1  +  spread( dk; t; a ) ]   = 
 
=  [ 1  +  transcosts( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1  +  fvcosts( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1  +  profit( t; a ) ] 
 
By the same token, the bid spread comes as 
(3) 
[ 1  +  spread( dk; t; b ) ]   = 
 
=  [ 1  +  transcosts( t; b ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1  +  fvcosts( t; b ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1  +  profit( t; b ) ] 
 
Spreads not only depend upon the date but also on any single dealer. In point of 
fact, each dealer bears his own cost-profit structure, although in some markets and 
along certain periods similarities could overtake differences. We move on to qualify 
the minimal framework required by a cost-profit structure.  
 
                                                 
12 For ease of notation, the dealer¢s identity will be dropped unless precision might be needed on 
this point.    11
a)  Firstly,  transaction  costs
13  seem  worthy  of  being  split  down  in  at  least  five 
components,  namely  trading  costs
14,  taxes,  financial  costs  linked  with  the 
transaction at hand
15, microstructure costs
16 and information costs
17:  
 
for the selling position of dealer dk 
(4) 
 
[ 1 + transcosts(t; a) ] = [ 1 + trading(t; a) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + taxes(t; a) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ 
 
´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + information(t; a) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + financial(t; a) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + microstructure(t; a) ] 
 
for the buying position of dealer dk 
(5) 
[ 1 + transcosts(t; b) ] = [ 1 + trading(t; b) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + taxes(t; b) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ 
 
´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + information(t; b) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + financial(t; b) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + microstructure(t; b) ] 
 
By all means, there are alternative methodologies for measuring transaction costs. 
For instance, the one introduced by Collins and Fabozzi (1991). 
                                                 
13 Further details  as  well as a comprehensive  analysis of transaction costs in the real  world of 
finance can be found in Apreda (2006, 2001, 2000). A insightful practitioner’s guide to transaction 
costs is provided by Ananth Madhavan (2002). 
14 Those directly linked to the purchase or the selling of an asset. 
15 These costs arise whenever the dealer takes out a loan (mainly though banks) to finance a long 
position or, in short selling cases, they account for collaterals and the marginal accounts involved to 
carry out such mechanism in the inter-dealer market (contrast with footnote 23).   
16 This new branded category of costs includes not only what regulations establish under the guise 
of law and enforcement but also the statutes, bylaws or rules of stock exchanges and over the 
counter exchanges. In general they are linked to those costs dealers and big intermediaries must 
cope with to comply with “the rules of the game”, even comprising the so-called market costs of 
entrance and exit. On the other hand, the expression “market microstructure” denotes the study of 
intermediation and the institutions of exchange (Spulber, 1996, p. 135).   
17  They  stem  from  search  costs,  monitoring  of  competitors,  financial  engineering,  arbitrage 
opportunities,  information  technology,  competitors¢  spread-discovery,  customers  advising,  the 
management  of  inventories  and  their  underlying  risks,  hidden  costs  arising  from  asymmetric 
information.    12
b) Whereas it would be highly desirable, on technical grounds, to apportion the 
rates  of  fixed  and  variable  costs  involved  in  any  transaction,  most  accountants 
working  in  the  intermediaries¢  back  office  would  still  favor  a  global  absorption 
procedure within the Statement of Earnings and Losses, a second-best procedure 
that  ease  painstaking  workload,  but  hinders  transparency,  accountability  and 
performance of each business unit in the dealer’s organization. 
 
c) Last of all, the phrase ²survival profit² has a variegated semantics in economics, 
and it deserves to be narrowed down to the scope of this paper.  
 
Definition 2 
For certain dealer dk , at date t, by ² ² ² ²survival profit² ² ² ² we mean the minimal rate 
of profit that he should claim after meeting his cost-structure, if he intends to 
keep up persistently doing business in his field of trade.  
 
According to which transaction leg we are dealing with, there would be a pair of 
survival profit rates, namely profit(t; a) and profit(t; b). If we wished to measure 
the whole rate of survival profit, we would have to solve 
(6) 
[ 1  +  profit( t ) ]  =   [ 1  +  profit( t; a ) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1  +  profit( t; b ) ] 
 
4. ABOUT REFERENCE PRICES AND SPREADS 
 
In  the  physical  world  of finance,  either  costs,  spreads,  conveniences  offered to 
investors  (Scitovsky,  1990),  profits  and  quasi-rents
18,  as  well  as  prices  and 
asymmetric information, they all really matter at the end of the day. Also market 
                                                 
18  Quasi-rents  arise  from  the  difference  between  total  revenue  and  total  out-of-pocket  costs, 
including those from running the business and those technically determined (Minsky, 1986, p. 200-
205). Section 5 will cast light on the quest for quasi-rents in the physical world of finance.    13
microstructure matters, because under certain protocols, exchanges may fail and 
large deviations between fundamental value and price usually come about
19.  
 
Although any single economic agent in the lowest level of retailing ultimately may 
purchase or sell financial assets, he has to place buy-or-sell orders upwards to a 
retail intermediary performing like a broker who, in turn, puts in a bulk of buy-or-sell 
orders through wholesalers, qualified dealers.  
 
Only big players with inventories and liquidity execute those orders to bring them 
into completion. They are the guys who set prices and returns, and it is by means 
of the top-bottom conveyor-belt of retailers and brokers, that single investors settle 
up their ultimate long or short positions. The whole mechanism of such hierarchical 
and manifold trading entails a profit motive that could be framed under the label of 
²the quasi-rents pursuit². Let us expand on such pertaining issues. 
 
4.1.  REFERENCE ASKED PRICE AND THE ASKED SPREAD 
 
On  the  selling  side,  dealers  as  well  as  powerful  intermediaries,  will  design  a 
referential selling price that will result from compounding a technical value 
 
V( t ) 
with the spread that measures the cost-profit structure in (2)  
(7) 
[ 1  +  spread( t; a ) ]   = 
 
=  [ 1  +  transcosts( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1  +  fvcosts( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1  +  profit( t; a ) ] 
 
Next definition adds precision to this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
19 See Madhavan (2002) on this subject.   14
Definition 3 
For certain dealer dk, at date t, by the reference price on the selling side of 
the transaction, it is meant the expression 
 
RP 
a ( t )  =  V( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1  +  spread( t; a ) ] 
 





a (t)  mean? To all intents and purposes, RP
a(t) plays the role of a 
budgetary  break-even  value,  from  which  the  dealer  will  cover  his  costs-profit 
structure. What kind of profit rate are we speaking about? It is the minimum level of 
expected profit that could grant the intermediary a survival edge (definition 2). That 
is why  we must regard RP
a(t) as the lowest price at which the dealer keeps a 
break-even position, sells the financial asset, and makes a profit. But he knows 
that  market  pressures  would  bring  about  prices  below  or  higher  the  reference 
asked-price
20. 
                                                 





a ( t )  =  V( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 +  spread( t; a ) ] 
 
V
 ( t ) 
value line 
Exhibit 1 
time line   15
4.2. REFERENCE BID PRICE AND THE BID SPREAD 
 
Now, let us move on to figure out the bid reference price which must cover the 
cost-profit structure as the breakeven value that saddles such structure with the 
technical value: 
 
V( t )   =   RP 
b ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1  +  spread( t; b ) ] 
 
Solving for the reference price, we get 
 
V( t ) 
RP 
b ( t )  =    
[ 1  +  spread( t; b ) ] 
 
which brings about next definition. 
 
Definition 4 
For certain dealer dk, at date t, by the reference price on the buying side we 
mean the expression 
 
RP 
b ( t )   =   V( t ) /  [ 1  +  spread( t; b ) ] 
 
Exhibit 2 below lends intuition to this definition and the discussion below. 
 
4.3.  THE GLOBAL SPREAD  
 
At this juncture, we can gather up the outcomes discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2, 
by means of a single global spread that ties together both the reference asked and 
bid prices.  
 




Taking advantage of definition 3  
 
RP 
a ( t )  =  V( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1  +  spread( t; a ) ] 
 
and applying definition 4, we get eventually 
 
RP 
a ( t )  =  RP 
b ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( t; b ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( t; a ) ] 
 
Let us denote the global spread by spread(t), and move on to qualify this concept 
(see Exhibit 3). 
 
Definition 5 
For a certain dealer d k , at date t, by the global spread it is meant  
 
1 + + + +  spread( d k ;  t )    =    [ 1 + spread( t; b ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( t; a ) ] 
 
Now we can link the referential asked-price with the referential bid-price, by means 




 ( t ) 
time line 
value line 
RP( t )  =  V( t )  /   [ 1  +  spread( t; b ) ] 
Exhibit 2   17
(8) 
RP 
a ( t )  =  RP 





4.4 REFERENCE PRICES ARE NOT THE SAME AS RESERVATION PRICES 
 
By reservation price it is usually meant the biggest price a buyer is going to pay for 
a good or service, or the smallest price at which the seller is going to dispose of a 
good  or  service.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  underlying  decision-making  points  to 
ceilings  or  floors  that  investors  set  up  when  putting  their  orders  to  brokers, 
intended to signpost their disposable income, information available to them about 
substitute goods or services, their risk-return preferences, and the time-value of 
liquid balances. 
 
It does not come as a surprise that on the dealers’ side, when speaking about 
reference price there could be an overlap with the notion of reservation price, as 




a ( t )  =  RP 




b ( t ) 
 
V
 ( t ) 
time line 
value line  Exhibit 3   18
difference between these values because, in contradistinction to reservation prices, 
it is for reference prices to perform basically as a budgetary break-even point to 
cover the dealer¢s cost-profit structure.   
 
5. PRICING IS ALSO THE QUEST FOR QUASI-RENTS 
 
Down-to-earth practices show that intermediaries cannot be regarded in a mere 
fictional profile or like robots out of this world. They intermediate, by all means, but 
most of them do so because, at the root of their job, they behave as quasi-rent 
seekers.   
 
5.1 THE PLAYERS 
 
Dealers are a sect of themselves just because they keep, to their own risk, plentiful 
inventories of financial assets as well as cash-flow balances at the reach of their 
hands  for  the  convenience  of  their  customers
21.  However,  both  the  notion  and 
scope of the word “dealer” proves to be elusive and fuzzy.  
 
It seems a matter of agreement that the key function of any dealer encompasses 
the carrying out of three defining and complementary tasks
22: 
 
a)  Whenever  a  buyer  requests  from  him  certain  financial  asset,  he  must 
provide it in the shortest time. It is this commitment that allows the dealer to 
match the demand for immediacy triggered off by buyers. 
   
b)  Whenever  a  seller  offers  certain  financial  asset  to  be  purchased  by  the 
dealer, it is for the latter to deliver cash to his customer in the shortest time 
in what is called the supply of liquidity. 
                                                 
21 Scitovsky (1990) delivered a very provocative analysis of conveniences in asymmetric markets. 
22 More background on this issue in Demsetz (1968), Spulberg (1996), Treynor (1995), Shleifer 
(1999), Apreda (2001, 2006).   19
c)  To meet either immediacy or liquidity needs of investors, he must build up a 
variegated inventory of financial assets and hold a stand-by balance of cash 
flows or, by default, extremely liquid assets. Furthermore, dealers must get 
access  to  short-term  credit  mainly  through  banks,  since  many  of  their 
transactions happen to be highly leveraged
23.    
 
Sometimes, the dealer¢s role is regarded as if it were a passive one, by which he 
patiently expects the arrival of sell and buy orders at his trading desk. Nothing 
could be farthest from the truth.  
 
To fully accomplish their tasks, dealers engage in permanent arbitrage, since they 
have to find out which assets are cheaper than they should be, so as to buy them 
at that date, and sell them later, and which are more expensive than it should be 
expected, so as to sell them at that date, and repurchase them later. If the financial 
asset A can be regarded as cheaper or expensive, from the viewpoint of a certain 
dealer dk, at date t, it will depend upon the contrasting analysis of market values 
P
a(A; t) and P
b(A; t), reference asked and bid prices RP
a(A; t) and RP
b(A; t),, as 
well as technical values V( A; t ).  
 
But the search of either cheaper or expensive assets does not end by figuring out 
reliable values from the former decision-makers variables. Dealers must ascertain 
whether they are meeting a single arbitrage opportunity or, in contrast, the fact 
remains  that  what  they  actually  face  is  a  buyer¢s  or  a  seller¢s  market.  It  goes 
without saying that such endeavors amount to information costs, mainly under the 
guise of hidden costs of trading which are pervasive and not easily quantified. Let 
us expand on this matter a little further. 
                                                 
23 As Hyman Minsky (2008, pp. 228-229) put it:  
A firm with a liability structure can be conceived of as a cash-flow machine earning quasi-rents from 
its operations and making payments to the holders of its debts. Whereas the payment commitments 
(both principal and interest) are given by contract and are known, especially if they are dated, the 
quasi-rents are inherently conjectural and subjective.    20
When  a  dealer  trades  with  an  approaching  investor  he  likely  confronts  a 
challenging and risky setting: 
 
a)  He may be smarter than the investor as regards information about the asset 
and, therefore, he will be able to set the final price, providing the customer 
either  with  liquidity  or  the  requested  asset,  without  delay.  In  the  best 
scenario, some of his investors might be very anxious, in the sense depicted 
by Treynor
24 (1967) and hence the dealer will earn higher quasi-rents. 
  
b)  But there are investors with a hidden agenda, who are smarter than the 
dealer, and wish to buy or sell financial assets if and only if they ultimately 
set the price. In this opposite event, his counterpart will likely undergo a 
decline  or  a  sheer  loss  in  his  quasi-rents.  Some  of  those  investors  are 
professionals with an outstanding skill in valuing financial assets, regularly 
outpacing dealers; they were called ²bargain hunters²
25 by Treynor.  
 
Some authors regard bargain hunters as a sort of market makers and not dealers. 
Nonetheless,  this  is  relative,  and  we  find  in  practice  that  a  dealer  could  also 
behave as a bargain hunter or a market maker, or the two latter as a dealer, since 
their final behavior is context-dependent.  
 
The  role  of  market  makers  goes  beyond  the  expertise  and  duties  of  a  dealer, 
however. It will be a considered judgment if we look upon them with a broader 
mind, as Paul Davidson pointed out in his book Financial Markets, Money, and the 
Real World (2002, pp. 75-76): 
 
In a world where the future is uncertain, in order to assure an orderly market, an institution known 
as a ²market maker² must exist. A market maker is defined as an institution that publicly announces 
                                                 
24 Whereas there are authors that call them noise traders, others use the term non-informed traders, 
albeit with contrasting shades of meaning.  
25 They also are referred as informed traders or bottom-fishers. 
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a willingness to act as a residual buyer or seller to assure orderliness and continuity if an abrupt 
disruptive change occurs on either the demand or supply side of the market. [ … ] the market maker 
requires a buffer stock of the asset being traded in the market plus a significant  stock of money 
(and/or immediate access to obtain additional money when required).   
 
Summing up, the word “dealer” is polysemic. That is to say it conveys manifold and 
distinctive meanings, depending on the field of application the analyst is focusing 
on at a certain date. 
 
 
5.2 THE QUEST FOR QUASI-RENTS 
 
 




a 2  ( t )    〈 〈 〈 〈    RP 
a ( t )    〈 〈 〈 〈     P 
a 1  ( t ) 
 
In point of fact, the cost-profit structure could be inflexible to changes in the very 
short run. What (9) tells is that whenever the dealer gets a better price than the 
reference one, he will earn a quasi-rent return rate  
 
quasi-rent 1 (t; a), 
 
whose value is worked out by solving  
(10) 
P 
a 1  ( t )   =   RP 
a ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´  [  1  + quasi-rent 1 ( t; a )  ]  
 
and from (9) it holds that 
quasi-rent 1 ( t; a )  〉 〉 〉 〉  0 
 
On  the  contrary,  market  values  below  the  benchmark-value,  could  not  only 
deteriorate the profit rate but could even fail to cover the cost structure. In this   22







a 2  ( t )   =   RP 
a ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´  [  1  + quasi-rent 2 ( t; a )  ]  
 
and also from (9) it holds that 
 
quasi-rent 2 ( t; a )  〈 〈 〈 〈  0 
 
In  a  down-to-earth  approach,  the  argument  that  linked  asked  prices  with  the 




b 4  ( t )    〈 〈 〈 〈    RP 
b ( t )    〈 〈 〈 〈     P 





a ( t )  =  V( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 +  spread( t; a ) ] 
 
V
 ( t ) 
time line 
value line  Exhibit 4 
P1 
a ( t )  =  RP 
a ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 +  quasi-rent 1( t; a ) ] 
 
P2 
a (t)  =  RP 
a ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 +  quasi-rent 2 ( t; a ) ]   23
What (12) tells is that when the market allows the dealer to get a better price than 
the reference one, runnng at a superior profit because he gets access to a quasi-
rent rate,  




whose value is solvable from the following equation: 
(13) 
P 
b 3  ( t )   =   RP 
b ( t )  /  [  1  + quasi-rent 3 ( t; b )  ]  
 
And, again from (12) it holds that 
 
quasi-rent 3 ( t; b )  < 0 
 
and this entails that the dealer buys the financial asset without covering his cost-
profit structure; in point of fact, he pays off more money that the reference price 









b( t )  =  V( t )  /   [ 1  +  spread( t; b ) ] 
Exhibit 5 
P 3 
b( t )  =  RP
b( t )  /  [ 1 +  quasi-rent 3 ( t; b ) ] 
P 4 
b( t )  =  RP
b( t )  /   [ 1  + quasi-rent 4 ( t; b ) ]   24
In contrast, market values below the benchmark value widen the differential on 
behalf of the dealer, since he pays still less than the reference price. In this case, 
the dealer would run at a profit, what means facing a positive quasi-rent rate. 
(14) 
P 
b 4  ( t )   =   RP 
b ( t )  /  [  1  + quasi-rent 4 ( t; b )  ]  
 
and from (12) he mikes a higher profit than the budgeted one: 
 
quasi-rent 4 ( t; b )  >  0 
 
5.3 ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SPREADS 
 
The line of argument followed in sections 5.1 and 5.2 uncovers the linkage that 
arises out of quasi-rent rates earned or lost in contradistinction to market prices.    
 
·  A first step in the pricing of a financial asset consists in getting a technical 
value by means of a valuation model. In this paper, we took advantage of a 
model grounded in the temporal structure of rates of return adjusted for risk. 
 
·  Next step for the price-setter involves the design of a cost-profit structure 
which stands for a budgetary break-even point to back up his trading, by 
means of what we have called reference prices.  
 
·  Afterwards,  dealers,  market  makers,  and  bargain  hunters  get  down  to 
business in a dual decision-making background: 
 
a)  they trade physical objects, called financial assets, but at the same time 




                                                 
26 Such duality has been thoroughly examined in Apreda (2006).   25
In other words: in real markets, intermediaries and smart investors go beyond the 
buying  and  selling  of assets; the name of  the  game  seems to be  the  manifold 
stakes bet upon asymmetric information.  
 
The quantitative expressions for these causal implications are easily obtained by 
using the outcomes of section 5.2. 
 
Firstly, taking advantage of relationship (10)    
(15) 
P 
a ( t )  =  RP 
a ( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + quasi-rent ( t; a) ] 
 
and substituting definition 3 for the reference price: 
(16) 
P 
a ( t )  =  V( t ) ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + quasi-rent ( t; a) ] 
 
By the same token, from (13): 
(17) 
P 
b ( t )  =  RP 
b ( t ) / [ 1 + quasi-rent ( t; b) ] 
 
and substituting definition 4 for the reference price: 
(18) 
P 
b ( t )  =  V( t ) /  ( [ 1 + spread( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´ [ 1 + quasi-rent ( t; b) ] ) 
 
Now we look for a direct link between (16) and (18) getting:  
 
P 
a ( t )  =  P 
b ( t )  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( t; a ) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + quasi-rent ( t; a) ]  
 
´  [ 1 + spread( t; a ) ] ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + quasi-rent ( t; b) ] 
 
By coalescing spreads and quasi-rents into global expressions: 
(19)   26
P 
a ( t )  =  P 
b ( t )  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( d k; t ) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + quasi-rent ( d k ; t ) ]  
 
Relationship (19) furnishes with a precise frame that allows for a clear distinction 
between internal and external spread. 
 
·  By internal spread (also technical, or budgetary spread) 
 
spread( d k; t ) 
 
we mean the measure of the cost-profit structure. 
 
·  Whereas the external spread comes out of the expression: 
 
[ 1 + external spread( d k; t ) ]  =  
  
=  [ 1 + spread( d k; t ) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + quasi-rent ( d k ; t ) ]  
 
The external spread is the lever by which any dealer adjusts his own inventories 
and weighs up his quasi-rents. For the sake of illustration, let us see how (19) 
becomes functional to such adjustment in three key examples. 
 
Case 1: market prices are set by the dealer 
 
In this scenario, prices are discretionally handled but the spread is constant, at 
least in the very short-time. The dealer reaps his benefit by adjusting the quasi-
rents so as to balance the relationship 
 
P 
a ( t )  =  P 
b ( t )  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + spread( d k; t ) ]  ´ ´ ´ ´  [ 1 + quasi-rent ( d k ; t ) ]  
 
It goes without saying that he stands to gain or to lose eventually. 
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Case 2: bargain hunters set market prices which remain under their control.  
 
The dealer works out his quasi-rent in the relationship above, either standing to 
lose most from the intended transaction, rejecting doing business for the time being 
because  he  forestalls  that  bargain  hunters  could  be  disguising  the  superior 
asymmetric information on their side.  
 
Case 3: the market place becomes more uncertain. 
 
For  instance,  competitors  launch  a  challenge  by  adjusting  their spreads,  or  the 
management  of  inventories  becomes  riskier.  In  such  a  case,  the  dealer  might 
resort to (19) with a three-tier approach: 
 
·  He can change the spread, by charging a higher rate of information costs 
(search becomes more hazardous), but also by appraising a higher rate 
of microstructure costs (since keeping inventories turns out to be more 
expensive and volatile). 
 
·  Otherwise, he could narrow down the quasi-rent rate, to the extent of 
making it null or even negative, constraining himself to get a survival 
profit at the most. 
 





This paper claims that the pricing of financial assets in the physical world of finance 
entails the management of four tiers of decision-making: 
 
·  Getting a technical value that comes out of a valuation model. 
·  Working out a cost-benefit structure to be linked to such technical value.   28
·  Taking  advantage  of  market  patterns  of  behavior  at  the  time  of  the 
pricing. 
·  Realizing that pricing goes hand in hand with a quest for quasi-rents in 
contexts of asymmetric information. 
 
Running through the threads of this four-tiered approach, we have derived a set of 
relationships to establish causal and quantitative connections between reference 
prices, spreads, trading prices and quasi-rents. 
  
Far from being unexpected facts, quasi-rents neither come out of the blue nor out 
of sheer luck. Intermediaries run their trading sometimes at a profit and other times 
at a loss, which entails positive or negative quasi-rent rates, respectively. Quasi-
rents stem from the gap between actual out-of-pocket prices and the reference 
prices.   
 
But  their  choices  are  meaningful  when  they  carry  out  their  business  so  as  to 
overcome the break-even point level required to hedge the cost-profit structure, in 
their risky pursuit of benefit.  
 
Bringing back the well-known Treynor¢s insight, by embedding the quest for quasi-
rents  into  the  analysis,  we  have  tried  to  add  up  meaning,  accountability  and 
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